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Virtual Reality (VR) is expected to become an enabling tech-
nology for training in realistic conditions, data visualisation,
education and many other applications. However, there is
still limited research on cyber threats to VR environments
and even less on technical protections against them. We are
currently developing a VR testbed specifically designed for
assessing different cyber threats, their impact to user experi-
ence and corresponding defences. In this work in progress,
we demonstrate two novel approaches by which a cyber at-
tack can potentially cause VR sickness on demand based on
frame rate manipulation by taking advantage of GPU and
network vulnerabilities. We further show that a simple unsu-
pervised machine learning method using Isolation Forest can
provide early warning of such attacks likely before they have
significant impact on the VR system and its user.
1 Introduction
Virtual Reality (VR) is being adopted in a rapidly increasing
number of application domains. It is estimated that by 2025
the VR market will reach USD 20.9 billion [9] and the technol-
ogy will be on the way to become an important part of modern
digital infrastructure. Yet, unlike other digital environments
that have been scrutinised extensively in terms of the cyber
security risks they introduce (consider the Internet of Things,
Cloud computing and 5G), research in this space is still lim-
ited. We argue that this can become a considerable blind spot
in the protection of digital environments, especially as the
use of Head Mounted Displays (HMDs) reduces drastically
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users’ own ability to observe cues of malicious manipulation,
such as network state, CPU usage, physical devices attached
or web redirections.
To understand the nature of VR cyber threats, it is important
to view it against the two fundamental concepts of immersion
and presence. VR environments are designed for immersion
by presenting the human brain with artificially generated
stimuli, which is the sum total of sensory feedback based on
the hardware and software VR components [14], isolating
the user from the real world [3]. Presence is the subjective
experience of being there or the psychological response of the
user to the VR world, which in turn is dependent on immersion
and engagement [16]. With presence, the user is aware that
they are in a VR world, but respond to virtual entities like
they would in the real world, allowing for spatial and social
engagement similar to human behaviour in the real world.
These two aspects may be targets or facilitators of cyber
attacks. Some excellent examples of such attacks were demon-
strated by Casey et al. in [4] who exploited the OpenVR API
to disorient users, turn their HMD camera on without their
knowledge, overlay unwanted 2D images in their field of vi-
sion, and modify VR environmental factors that forced users
into hitting physical objects and walls. They coined a proof
of concept attack the “human joystick” where the user was
deceived into moving to a target physical location without
their knowledge. Immersion and the HMD’s suppression of
visual cues from the real world makes the human vulnerable
to such an attack in the same way a GPS spoofing attack has
been shown to remotely control a drone or a ship as if it were a
joystick [2]. A VR user relies on the integrity of the artificially
generated stimuli in largely the same manner. Along the same
lines of deception, Rafique and Sen-ching [13] developed a
device which uses an infrared LED to jam and manipulate an
HMD’s tracking system, as well as an attack that manipulates
the pose estimation by generating fake sync pulse.
As is the case in most emerging digital environments, work
on cyber protection mechanisms for VR environments has
mainly focused on risk assessment [5] and on preventing a se-
curity or privacy breach altogether through authentication. For
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example, Mathis, Fawaz, and Khamis [10] developed an au-
thentication method based on Guiard’s kinematic chain model
to address the issue of bystanders inferring user input. In their
method, the non-dominant handheld controller interacts with
a cube attached to it in VR, while the dominant controller
enters a set of PIN numbers displayed on the cube while in
VR. This two way handed interaction technique makes it dif-
ficult for a bystander to infer user input. They further added
a deep learning architecture for time series classification to
recognise a user’s legitimate behavioural biometric PIN input.
Lu et al. [8] proposed the use of hand motion authentication
with eye-free interaction in VR systems, while Li et al. [6]
proposed the use of brain signal biometric authentication.
Risk assessment and authentication-based prevention con-
stitute a good start in VR cyber security, but do not address the
need to detect whether a security breach has occurred when
prevention fails, especially for new threats. Here, we take the
first step towards intrusion detection in VR cyber security.
We recognise that it would be counterproductive to develop a
method that would detect an attack after it has caused impact
on the user, or that would generate erroneous warnings of
attacks (false positives) that would adversely affect a user’s
immersive experience. So, we evaluate our solution in terms
of the time it takes to detect an attack and provide a simple
suggestion on how to minimise false positives. To conduct
our experimental evaluations, we have developed a virtual en-
vironment designed to carry out a variety of cyber attacks and
observe their impact in different conditions and locomotion
techniques. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are:
• We devise a GPU-based attack involving a malware that
uses the OpenGL application programming interface
(API) to overwhelm the GPU resources.
• We devise a network-based attack with the aim of caus-
ing visual, interaction, locomotion and auditory disrup-
tions within a collaborative VR environment.
• We propose the first VR intrusion detection system
which utilises machine learning to detect an ongoing
attack and warn the user before its impact escalates.
2 Frame rate-oriented cyber attacks on user
experience
From a system perspective, attacks in VR may relate to the
GPU, sensors and displays, which jointly determine the out-
put, input and computing efficiency of a VR system, i.e. its
depth of information [14]. In this paper, we specifically focus
on GPU as it directly determines the frame rate and through
it the user experience. As proof of concept, we also target
the frame rate through a network denial of service attack, es-
pecially as collaborative VR environments require network
connection to function and typically network disruptions af-
fect the frame rate. Both attacks aim at maliciously causing
visual discomfort through disruption of user locomotion, inter-
action, audio and visuals, as framerate disruption is a known
major factor leading to VR sickness [17].
2.1 The VR test-bed
We have developed out testbed in the Unity 3D game engine,
using the XR Interaction Toolkit for the mechanics and var-
ious interaction techniques. We chose to use a Room-Scale
XR Rig, which allows for six degrees of freedom movement.
Locomotion was used as our main form of movement tech-
nique enabling the user to move around using the Joystick on
the controllers. The environment was designed as an office
space with objects placed at random locations, allowing the
user to freely interact with them. To run our experiments, we
used two VR-ready laptops (Alienware 51M: GeForce RTX
2060 and MSI GE66 Raider 10SGS: GeForce RTX 2070) and
two VR headsets (Oculus Rift S and Oculus Quest 2).
2.2 Cyber Attack 1: GPU-based attack
Cyber attacks on GPUs have been previously shown, but not
in relation to their impact on VR experience [12] [11] [15].
To implement our GPU-based attack, we created a malware
using the OpenGL API, designed to assign long running tasks
to the GPU, thereby affecting its availability to compute other
graphics tasks. We created our malware in C++, delivered in
the form of an executable file format (exe). Next, we created
a series of images to load into the GPU via the malware.
In our attack model, we assume that the target machine is
already compromised and our payload is delivered using a
post-exploitation tool, such as Meterpreter [1]. We configure
the intensity of the malware’s attack based on the size of the
image (in our case, 542 KB, 1.06 MB, 1.82 MB and 3.13 MB).
A simple batch script was developed to automate the attack.
The operation of the malware was hidden from the user using
lines of code;
HWND hWnd = GetConsoleWindow ( )
ShowWindow ( hWnd , SW_HIDE)
GLCall ( glfwHideWindow ( windowone ) )
Figure 2 shows the environment in normal conditions where
there is no visual discomfort (top) and during an attack (bot-
tom), where the frame rate has dropped and extreme screen
tearing is observed. Figure 1 further shows the mechanics
of the impact of the missed and dropped frames on frame
processing during an attack, which eventually leads to the VR
system crashing. The default time window for a VR device to
display images on the screen is 11 ms. VR uses reprojection,
a technique that warps the rendered image before sending
it to the display to correct for the head movement occurred
after the rendering. This can reduce latency and help maintain
frame rate. During the attack, frames take longer to render as
a result of the GPU being overwhelmed. This results initially
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Figure 1: Missed and dropped frames’ impact on frame processing during an attack
to dropped frames (which is experienced as judders and vi-
sual distortion). After a while, when warps also take too long,
missed frames start occurring, which eventually lead to the
VR system crashing.
2.3 Cyber attack 2: Network-based attack
This attack involves a script of continuous Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) echo requests to flood the target
machine in a simple denial of service manner (Figure 3). The
goal is to cause disruptions in a collaborative VR environment.
To explore its impact, we created a VR collaborative environ-
ment which allows for two users to remotely connect using
a server, set up with the Unity 3D package Photon (PUN2).
For remote communication, we used Photon Voice 2. We cre-
ated a batch script to initialize our attack in the form of a
distributed ping flood. Our experiment shows disruption in
engagement and interaction between the users as the frame
rate drops dramatically. Figure 3 shows our VR environment
where two users are actively interacting in normal conditions
(top) and then during the attack (bottom), with the impact of
the attack on the network traffic manifested as screen tearing
and a drop in frame rate.
3 Intrusion detection for GPU-based attack in
VR
Here, we propose a data-driven intrusion detection approach
using unsupervised machine learning to learn what is normal
for a particular VR system and warn the user of an attack
when our chosen set of parameters monitored show departure
Figure 2: Extreme tearing during GPU-based attack
from normal behaviour. We have used Isolation Forest im-
plemented in Python with the Scikit Learn library. Isolation
Forest requires no prior assumptions regarding the distribu-
tion of feature values [7], which makes it attractive in new
areas where there is limited knowledge of the parameters
monitored. In our experiments shown here, we perform the
GPU-based attack for different image sizes and using a two-
second sliding window (generating a feature vector with a
time series sequence transition between system indicators),
where we monitor: average framerate, framerate standard de-
viation, average frametime, frametime standard deviation, and
framerate entropy change.
Figure 4 shows the machine learning based classification
versus the actual state (whether there is an attack or not). Note
that shortly after the attack starts, the classification correctly
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Figure 3: Extreme tearing during network-based attack
turns from normal to attack too. We also see that there are
a small number of isolated false positives (attack states de-
tected while the groundtruth is a normal state). This would
be unacceptable for VR use, as triggering any warning to the
user would affect adversely their immersive experience. For
this reason, we propose to raise a flag and warn the user only
when there are a number of consecutive attack data points
detected. Empirically, we set this to two consecutive points
(which represents three seconds of sliding window system
state analysed by the machine learning process), which re-
moved all false positives at a cost of one extra second of delay
before raising a warning of a detected attack. Specifically, fol-
lowing the addition of the three consecutive detection rules,
the detection latency is calculated as shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: Detection latency
Attack 1 Attack 2 Attack 3 Attack 4
542 KB 1.06 MB 1.82 MB 3.13 MB
9 s 3 s 2 s 4 s
Table 2: Detection Accuracy
Attack 1 Attack 2 Attack 3 Attack 4
542 KB 1.06 MB 1.82 MB 3.13 MB
0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98
4 Conclusions
We have described our work in progress towards studying the
impact of cyber attacks in VR environments and developing
intrusion detection mechanisms for warning users. The ratio-
nale is that the earlier the users are warned about a particular
ongoing security breach, the more likely they will take ac-
tion in time to protect themselves. In the particular example
of a framerate-oriented attack, a reasonable action would be
(a) Attack 1 (Image size: 542KB)
(b) Attack 2 (Image size: 1.06 MB)
(c) Attack 3 (Image size: 1.82 MB)
(d) Attack 4 (Image size: 3.13 MB)
Figure 4: Machine learning classification results for all attack
intensities
to simply pause the session and take off the HMD, so as to
prevent VR sickness from developing. However, this is an as-
sumption and research is needed specifically to establish how
a user would and should behave upon recognition of an at-
tack. In addition, different attacks leave different cyber traces
and affect different system parameters. We have provided a
first example of an intrusion detection mechanism to serve as
proof of concept for further mechanisms, exploring different
attacks and the associated parameters to be monitored. In our
future work, we plan to carry out a large-scale user evalua-
tion of the proposed intrusion detection mechanism as the
logical next step to investigate its objective usefulness and
effectiveness in user experience.
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